How Labour Won

This is the first part of Labour Together’s review of the 2024 election, which looks at how Labour won. The second part, looking at what this means for how Labour wins again, will be published in the months ahead.

2019

In 2019, voters delivered a brutal judgement on Labour’s fitness to govern. Labour repelled swing voters up and down the country. It won just 202 seats.

2024

In 2024, Labour won an astonishing electoral victory. Astonishing because of the number and range of seats Labour won. Astonishing because the preceding election was Labour’s worst defeat since 1935.

Labour asked the country to trust that it had changed. To recognise that Keir Starmer had, in four short years, changed the Labour Party. To believe that Labour would govern in their interests and could be trusted with the public purse. To believe that Labour would put the country first, party second.

What follows is Labour Together’s review of how Labour won.

Shortly after the election, we asked over 10,000 people across the country, in polling and small focus groups, why they voted the way they did. We have worked closely with an independent Technical Advisory Panel to ensure the findings are a robust and accurate reflection of the result.

Above everything else, this election was about change. Labour usually loses elections. We argue that Labour was able to win this election for two reasons:

1.

Middle Britain was only willing to put their trust in Labour because it proved it had changed.

In 2019, voters thought Labour was more interested in party than in country. Keir Starmer showed that Labour was fit to govern and rid its ranks of antisemitism. Voters were willing to trust Labour with the public finances. Labour could only win because it had worked hard to prove it was a credible alternative. Because it could demonstrate it had changed, a decisive fraction of 2019 Conservative voters (12%) switched to Labour in 2024. As these voters have twice the impact in Conservative-Labour contests, winning these voters enabled Labour to secure the massive majority it did.


“The Conservatives’ campaign was nowhere near as strong as Keir Starmer’s, he was a fresh face and said that everything will change.”

– Jane, Leigh and Atherton


2.

Britain wanted a change of government.

The country achieved this by voting to get rid of Conservative MPs, in large numbers, by any means necessary. The Conservatives made promises to their right they did not keep. They alienated centre ground voters. Voters across the board had had enough of their corruption and incompetence. Only 45% of the 2019 Conservative coalition stuck with them. The rest splintered: 18% to parties on their left, 19% to Reform. 16% did not vote at all.


“They’ve failed in so many ways since COVID, it was just shambles - one thing after another and it became almost like an embarrassment and a laughing stock.”

– Mary, Hendon

But, Labour cannot be complacent.

In the past, winning 411 seats was the kind of victory from which a government might confidently expect 10 years in power.

This Labour government has been cautiously hired, on a trial basis, liable to prompt dismissal if it deviates even slightly from its focus on voters’ priorities. Voters hope it will deliver, but they do not necessarily expect it.

“I was so fed up with the state of everything and I just wanted to change. But it's a gamble. That's the only word I can come up with, because I'm not positive about it…I think we all felt like there was no choice whether you wanted to believe in the Labour policies or not. We are that desperate for change.”

– Lucy, Hendon

Labour won in a Britain weary of its politics and frustrated with its politicians. Less than 60% voted; and of these, less than 60% voted for the two main parties. Only 15% of the public say that they trust politicians. Each of these are at or near post war records. Many don’t believe that democracy is delivering and they are increasingly volatile as a result.

Labour is no stranger to this volatility. Its resurgence this year in Scotland came after its catastrophic wipe out in 2015. Labour lost seats in this election over its approach on Gaza and faces growing Green and Reform votes in different parts of the country.

The reality is that few voters are loyal. Many are currently giving Labour the benefit of the doubt, but they are watching, warily. Already, ex-Conservative voters are anxious Labour might not have really changed:

“I think we needed that change to Labour. We all want change, we all want something different, we all want it to be fairer - but will this come into action? I hope it will, but I’m not a hundred percent sure.”

Abi, Stirling

Voters see governing in zero sum terms. They expect Labour to act on their priorities. Of course, any progressive party has passions that range much more widely than a narrow list. Regardless of the value of these passions, voters will regard them with extreme suspicion if they are not connected to their biggest concerns.

The Conservatives learnt the wrong lesson from the 2019 election. They believed they had created a new permanent base of socially conservative voters in traditional Labour seats. This became conventional wisdom. But it wasn’t true.

The lesson for Labour is clear. Unlike the Conservatives, Labour must never take voters for granted. Indeed, it cannot, because many are simply giving Labour a chance. It must approach every day of governing in the knowledge that it will need to persuade voters again and again and again. They must focus on their priorities, not get distracted by pet projects. Incumbency will only be an advantage if people feel the government is improving their lives.

We do not aim for the final word, an exhaustive analysis or academic chapter and verse. In particular, we do not consider the strengths and weaknesses of the short campaign. Our aim is to set out a deep, realistic and strategic understanding of the most important reasons Labour won in 2024. In the coming months, we will set out the foundations of a strategy for Labour to win again at the next election.

The remainder of this review is structured as follows:

How Britain Voted

An outline of the key facts of the election, the geographical spread of Labour’s victory.

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Fragmentation & Frustration

This election placed in its historic context. Turnout, trust in politicians and faith in our democracy are all at their lowest ebb.

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A Change Election

The electorate had an overwhelming desire for change. This carried Labour to victory because Labour could demonstrate that it had changed itself.

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Labour’s Voters

The main electoral building blocks of Labour’s victory were a voter coalition of diverse prior allegiances with Middle Britain at its core. The median voter decides elections and they voted for Labour. This section also sets out the nature of Labour’s losses in 2024.

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Why The Conservatives Lost

The scale of Conservative collapse was astonishing and in all directions, to their left and right flanks. We set out the contribution this made to their losses.

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How Britain Voted

In July 2024 Britain’s electoral map was radically transformed. Blue turned to red.

Labour won 411 seats - the second highest number in its history, doubling its seat count, reversing its worst result since 1935. The Conservatives won 121, the lowest number of seats in their history and the Liberal Democrats secured the best in theirs (72).

Labour won 1 seat in 2019. It increased this number 37-fold in 2024. The SNP decreased from 48 seats to 9. The Conservatives had one of their better results - despite their vote halving, they lost just 1 seat, while the Liberal Democrats increased their seat count by 2.

In Wales, the Conservatives were completely wiped out. Labour was the overwhelming beneficiary, winning 27 out of 32 seats. Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats increased their net seat count by 1.

Middle Britain decided this election. These voters in the centre ground of Britain usually decide elections. It was their desire for change that mattered most.

Middle Britain

Middle Britain refers to the voters in the ideological centre of the country. These voters are slightly to the left on economic issues and more authoritarian on many cultural issues. These voters were important in the 2024 election because this is exactly the values of 2019 Conservative to 2024 Labour switchers. 

Labour pursued an electoral strategy that was relentless in persuading these voters that it had changed, that it shared their values and that it would act on their priorities.

Middle Britain moved to Labour because Labour had moved back to Middle Britain under Keir Starmer’s leadership.

“I’ve always voted Conservative, but it got to the point where I was thinking there’s got to be something better than this.”

– Alex, Leigh and Atherton

“I'm just absolutely fed up with the Tories, they've collapsed. Then there was the scandal with the SNP, it only leaves you one way to vote.”

Tom, Stirling

In Scotland, the SNP and Conservatives were deserted by huge amounts of their 2019 vote. The remaining rump of loyal voters was all they could rely on. It was not nearly enough.

Labour’s voting coalition was diverse. It maintained most of its 2019 voters and attracted voters from Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Some of Labour’s 2019 voters lent their vote to other parties in seats where Labour was not in contention, to ensure that Conservative MPs were defeated.

Reform was the numerically largest beneficiary of the 2019 Conservative collapse, taking approximately one in five of the Conservatives’ 2019 voters. Reform took a much smaller number of votes from the Liberal Democrats and from Labour.

Conservative switchers to Labour and the Liberal Democrats had just as significant an impact, if not more, on the final tally of Conservative seats. While smaller in number, these voters usually had twice the impact of switchers to Reform, because there were so many seats that were a straight contest between Conservatives and Labour or Liberal Democrats. In other words, they removed one voter from the Conservative count and added it to Labour or the Liberal Democrats.

The other major feature of these results was extraordinary levels of tactical voting and vote swapping among more progressive parties. This is discussed in greater detail in the section on the Conservative collapse.

The most important voter groups for Labour were Middle Britain: Conservative to Labour switchers throughout the country. In Scotland, SNP to Labour switchers were also pivotal.

Middle Britain decided. But they did so in a country and a democracy that is being shaped by two forces that - if not tackled by the centre left - will continue to fuel the rise of alternatives. To understand the 2024 election result, we have to start with these trends in Britain’s mood.

Fragmentation & Frustration

The forces that shaped this election.

Across the political spectrum, Britain is fragmenting because its people are frustrated. Party loyalties are increasingly weakly held and trust in politics to improve lives is fading. Labour’s victory was huge. But because of these forces, its electoral coalition is fragile. Labour must be humble in the face of these facts.

The combined vote share of the main two parties has been in long-term decline since 1945. In 2024 this fell to a historic post-war low of 57%.

Partly, this is down to the decline in traditional class allegiance driving voting. Without this anchor, fewer voters feel an immediate pull of loyalty to any single party. This makes a wider range of cultural values and attitudes relatively more influential for voters, as well as making (perceived) performance more decisive in voting choice.

This adds up to a more volatile electorate. Just 1 in 10 very strongly support a political party. Voters are much more transactional than they used to be.

This volatility has challenged both main political parties. Labour was its victim in 2019. The Conservatives were almost destroyed by it in 2024.

Underneath that volatility, the basic task of politicians and politics - to act on voters’ priorities - remains the same. Voters are, with notable exceptions, consistent on the issues they cared about in 2024. The NHS. The cost of living.

It is faith in politicians’ capacity to deliver that is collapsing. It is this faith Labour should focus on restoring.

The Conservatives lost because voters thought they didn’t care about their promises or delivery, and because they demonstrated they didn’t share their basic values. They promised. They failed. And they paid the price.

“​​I feel like we have been told lies, it doesn’t feel honest - I don’t have much faith in politics and politicians.”

Valerie, Hendon

“​​A lot of people have lost faith in the Conservatives due to all the lies and the deceit - there’s work to be done to gain people’s trust back properly.”

Sophie, Wakefield

Frustration

Fewer voters believe that our democracy delivers. Trust in politicians has declined to record lows. Fewer people vote. The British people have been clearer and clearer about this over decades.

This verdict is understandable - warranted, even. It is hardly surprising when average wages are only a few pounds per week higher than their pre-financial crisis peak in 2008. 16 years of hard work has barely earned Britain’s workers an extra meal out per month.

Politics just hasn’t been delivering real benefits for that many people.

These forces of frustration and fragmentation are not isolated. They are connected. They drive our politics and help explain the 2024 election result.

These drivers have two major effects in 2024. The first is that the decline in two party voting is more dramatic when we take account of declining turnout. Our poll finds that around one in five 2019 Labour voters did not vote this time (20%), while 16% of 2019 Conservative voters did not vote.

Frustration is broadly shared but acutely felt. Voters for smaller parties and non-voters are much less likely to trust politicians and much more likely to believe democracy is not working.

Distrust in politicians and Britain’s democracy is closely correlated with voting for smaller parties. Their choice of smaller party is then driven by their underlying values. It used to be that the Liberal Democrats benefited from this frustration. But as this frustration has spread, other options on the left and the right are now feasible.

This, then, is the context for the 2024 election and the challenge for Labour. Britain’s democracy is not delivering. A majority of voters for all parties have little faith in politicians’ desire to help ordinary people. This has driven support for smaller parties, lower turnout and declining trust in politicians and democracy.

Trends are not destiny. They can be reversed. But it is these trends that underpin the 2024 election and will shape the next government.

A Change Election

“The vote was really for change, simple as that.”

Dave, Bristol East

Change

This was the driving force of this election. It is the one message and desire that mattered.

The Conservatives were - and are - the object of fury.

But Labour won by changing. It moved towards the average voter. Moderate 2019 Conservative voters saw this and put their trust in Labour.

For every party’s voters, except the Conservatives, change was among the top motivations for voting.

Individual voters are even louder on this front. Change was dominant with the voters we spoke to. They mentioned it more than 250 times across 18 hours of discussion. Often this overwhelmed all other considerations.

Labour convinced voters that they were the change they were looking for.

“The Conservative’s campaign was nowhere near as strong as Keir Starmer’s, he was a fresh face and said that everything will change.”

Jane, Leigh and Atherton

For every element of Labour’s coalition change was one of the three most important reasons for voting. It motivated the right too. Conservative to Reform voters chose it as their second most important reason.

This desire for change carried Labour to victory. But it is a time-limited investment: 

“I wanted to give Labour a go, I’d like to see if they can do something - I’m on the fence with sticking with them and hopefully they can bring some positive change.”

Alex, Leigh and Atherton

“I feel like our voices are never really heard - but there’s a possibility of good change with what Keir Starmer is promising.”

– Fred, Hendon

They were also specific. Voters wanted change for two other reasons: they believed Labour had changed and they were willing to place their trust - temporarily - to act on their priorities.

Labour had changed

Labour needed to prove its values weren’t alien to the electorate. It succeeded.

In 2019, voters were repelled.

“They were going to tax everything and spend money we haven’t got”.  

“[Corbyn] is not patriotic…You want someone with good old values.”

“It was easy for me, the simple fact that I couldn’t possibly have voted for Corbyn, although I’ve been a Labour voter all my life.”

[1]

Keir Starmer’s leadership and transformation of the Labour Party has been critical. He led a change in the Labour Party that convinced key voters to look at Labour again.

“When they got rid of Jeremy Corbyn, they got a lot more votes - [Labour] wanted to detach themselves from him and putting Keir Starmer in his place made the people that really didn't like Labour open up and warm up to [him].”

– Daniel, Hendon

Shortly after the election, Conservative to Labour switchers had a net favourability rating of +64 for Keir Starmer compared to Rishi Sunak’s net favourability of -44.

Former Conservatives were overwhelmingly likely to say they were delighted (18%), excited (11%) or pleased (45%) at the result. Over half thought that the Labour Party and Keir Starmer will get the balance right between caution and radicalism. Over half expect public services to get better.

Acting on voters’ priorities

Rather than looking inward, Labour looked to voters’ priorities. This paid off. Labour’s voters believe Labour will make a meaningful difference on their priorities. 97% of voters who chose Labour believe that Labour will make a noticeable difference to the NHS, 96% believe it will make a difference to the cost of living. For Conservative to Labour switchers, this is 97% for the NHS and 93% for the cost of living.

This is a positive endorsement of Labour’s ability to change the country. Now Labour has to begin the work of change.

Labour’s Voters: Who Labour Won and Who Labour Lost

Labour moved towards Middle Britain and Middle Britain moved towards Labour.

Voters who switched away from the Conservatives and the SNP were the decisive part of Labour’s winning coalition. 

Labour largely lost votes in seats where it was safe to do so.

Labour lost vote share in its safest seats, but this had little impact on the number of Labour seats relative to the Conservatives. 

Labour’s voter coalition in England and Wales

9.7 million people voted Labour in 2024. Labour won 411 seats - more than double the number in 2019. The chart below shows the key components of that vote.

Previous Labour voters formed the bedrock of Labour’s vote in England and Wales. [2] 6% of Labour’s votes came from 2019 Liberal Democrat voters - most of whom switched in seats where Labour was the main challenger to the Conservatives (see the chart below).

Who were the decisive voters?

The decisive group were Conservative to Labour switchers – 14% of Labour’s vote share. In a Conservative-Labour contest, every one of their votes counts double. They subtract one vote from the Conservative pile and add one to Labour. This is what makes them decisive. They are the most important group to win.

These voters were squarely in the middle of England and Wales: ideologically, demographically and attitudinally. The average age overall is 49, theirs was 52. They are as educated as the typical Briton. They have roughly similar salaries and household income to average people.

Ideologically, these voters are very close to the average voter, as measured by a set of questions on social issues (immigration, punishment and respect for British values) and economic issues (wealth distribution, tax/spend and nationalisation/privatisation). [3]

Conservative to Labour switchers were slightly less authoritarian than loyal Conservative voters - though fewer were strong authoritarians (one quarter versus one third). But they were significantly more left wing than loyalist Conservative voters.

We also asked voters to place themselves and political parties on a left-right scale (1 being very right-wing, 7 very left wing). The average self assessment for the whole electorate is 3.7, slightly left of centre (4 being the middle of this scale). They place Labour closer to themselves (distance = 0.85) than the Conservatives (distance = 1.18).

Conservative to Labour switchers think of themselves as very slightly closer to the centre than the average voter (distance = 0.13 from the centre). They also now perceive Labour as closer to them ideologically (distance = 0.66) than the Conservatives (1.05).

Conservative to Labour switchers cared about the cost of living, health and the economy, followed by immigration, just like the average voter. But migration is much more important to this part of Labour’s coalition than it is for Labour voters on average.

The Conservatives tried to make tax central to the campaign, through baseless claims that Labour planned a £2,000 annual ‘bombshell’. But tax was not among the top issues for these voters (or any other voter group). Indeed, Conservative to Labour switchers are slightly more likely than the average voter to say that taxes should go up somewhat to fund public services.

Two other facts about this group of voters are worth discussing. Firstly, compared to loyal Conservative voters, Conservative to Labour switchers are more likely to be paying a mortgage or renting. Housing tenure among 2019 Conservative voters was strongly predictive of likelihood of voting Labour in 2024. Compared to those who own outright, Conservative voters of every other tenure type were significantly more likely to switch to Labour in 2024. [4]

Secondly, one notable difference is that Conservative to Labour switchers were somewhat more likely to vote for Brexit than the average voter. In fact, their Brexit vote was largely in line with the 2024 Conservative vote. Therefore, Conservative to Labour switchers were not (just) the remain-voting part of the Conservative 2024 vote. This finding is consistent with the much reduced salience of the referendum for most voters (only 8% of voters believe it is the most important issue facing the country).

Conservative to Labour switchers are more authoritarian than the rest of Labour’s voter coalition. Ultimately, they had no faith in what the Conservatives were offering and believed economic issues and the NHS were of much greater importance in 2024.

Labour’s voting coalition in Scotland

Labour’s fortunes were even more dramatically revived in Scotland. In 2019, Labour were beaten into third in Scotland by the Conservatives, gaining just 27% of the vote. The SNP won 45% of the vote, delivering them 48 out of 59 seats available in Scotland.

At this election, Labour’s vote share in Scotland increased by 17 points. Labour won 37 out of 57 seats [5], while the SNP were reduced to 9. The Scottish election is summarised in the following chart.

The SNP voting coalition fell apart. The SNP retained just a little over half of its 2019 voters (54%). The SNP coalition in 2024 comprised a loyalist, pro-independence core, for whom Scottish independence remains one of the three most important issues facing Scotland. 93% of their 2024 voters indicated they would vote yes in a second referendum; up from 78% in 2019. [6]

For most Scots, the importance of independence has receded. It is the joint 6th most important issue of voters overall. Most voters are simply more concerned with the cost of living and the NHS, followed by immigration and the economy. This election was about problems that affect the whole country with equal force.

This enabled Labour to attract a diverse base. 20% of Scottish Labour voters in 2024 voted for the SNP in 2019. 24% previously voted Conservative. It was former SNP voters who mattered most to Labour’s victory, because - as in England and Wales - they subtracted a vote from the SNP total and added one to Labour’s. The Conservative vote collapsed to Labour’s benefit in Scotland.

“They [the SNP] didn’t accomplish any of the things they said they were going to do.”

– Rachel, Stirling

Labour was able to attract voters from across the (now, less salient) independence divide. The vast majority of 2019 Conservatives who voted Labour this time were unionists (91%). A plurality of 2019 SNP voters who switched to Labour supported independence (46%) and one in five of them are undecided (19%). These voters were much less likely to view independence as one of the most important issues: 5% for former SNP voters and 8% for former Conservative voters. Middle Scotland emerged: a centre ground who are less invested in Scottish independence and voted Labour because it focussed on what voters said their top priorities were. Change was most important to SNP to Labour switchers, with 50% choosing it as one of their biggest reasons for voting.

Whilst just 5% of 2019 SNP to Labour switchers place the issue of Scottish independence / Scotland’s relationship with the rest of the UK in their top three most important issues facing the country, for SNP loyalists this figure is 37%.

It is not just the SNP’s incessant focus on independence that led to the fracturing of their coalition. Those who switched from the SNP to other parties cited issues of competence (27%) and corruption (20%) as reasons for not voting for them again in 2024. The impact of the corruption scandal seems to have been a particular turning point for the SNP: they fell from polling at 43% in December, 2022, to 33% by October, 2023 as Nicola Sturgeon resigned and details of the scandal emerged. [7]

The median voter plays a central role in understanding Labour’s success in England and Wales. Their role is more nuanced in Scotland. In Scotland, right-of-centre Conservative voters were motivated to vote Labour against the SNP. Left-of-centre SNP voters were motivated because they wanted change and because they were sick of both the Conservatives and SNP. This led to a more diverse ideological coalition for Labour in Scotland than in England and Wales.

Labour’s ability to attract Conservative voters suggests a strong tactical desire to beat the SNP. This, combined with attracting voters on the right of the SNP’s 2019 coalition, help to explain Labour’s remarkable recovery.

This is also supported by the perceived ideological difference between voters and different parties. 2019 SNP to Labour switchers consider Labour to be in exactly the same place politically as them. Conservative to Labour switchers are much closer to the Conservatives than Labour, but the SNP was the furthest way. On average, the Conservative Party was considered much further right than most voters perceive themselves.

The story in Scotland mirrors that of England and Wales. Labour’s success in focusing on Scottish voters’ priorities helped Labour secure its extraordinary reversal in fortunes in Scotland.

Where Labour lost ground

The chart below shows that in the seats where Labour needed to win, Labour vote share rose the most and Conservative vote share declined the most. By targeting the most important voters - Middle Britain - in a fragmented environment, Labour won a majority of 174 with 34% of the vote.

The safer the Conservative-held seat, the bigger the decline in their vote share. While they retained their very safest seats (often by small majorities), this relationship had devastating consequences for them in hundreds of seats.

Labour’s vote also declined in its safest seats. However, this mattered much less because Labour’s 2019 voters who either did not vote in 2024 or voted Green were clustered disproportionately in Labour’s safest seats.

There is also some evidence that switchers from Labour to the Greens decided very close to the wire, when the media narrative was predicting an overwhelming Labour victory. A significant number of Green voters decided in the final two weeks, with 28% of Green voters deciding on the day. This was much higher than any other party.

Of course, Labour’s Middle Britain strategy was not without costs. In Bristol West and Islington North, Labour lost two seats to its left. Because of the high efficiency of Labour’s vote, Labour now has a much higher proportion of marginal seats to defend against left wing challengers than it once did.

Many traditional Labour voters in Muslim communities switched to independents over Gaza. There was a strong correlation between decline in Labour’s vote share and the proportion of Muslims in a constituency. This cost Labour 4 seats to independents. In the 17 seats where independents came second, Labour holds a lower average majority than it does where the Conservatives are second place.

The depth of feeling about the situation in some, particularly Muslim, communities was profound. Its impact on voting intention was understated ahead of the election, in part because high quality polling of ethnic minorities is rare.

But by far Labour’s biggest threats still come on its right. The Conservative Party is still the dominant opponent, and Labour’s average majority over the Conservatives across all seats where they are second place is just 14%. Next comes Reform, where Labour’s majorities are a healthier 25% on average.

In contrast, the Greens are a second place threat to Labour in 39 seats - in these seats, Labour’s average majority is 34%.

Compared to 1997, Labour’s opposition is much more diverse. But again, this is largely due to the right fracturing. In 1997, Conservatives came second in 340 Labour seats. In 2024, combined Conservative and Reform came in second in 308 Labour seats.

Why The Conservatives Lost

Labour was devastated by voter volatility in 2019. Voters who had never voted Tory in their life broke their habit and went over to the Conservatives. In 2024 that tide turned back in Labour’s favour, with interest. It was the worst result for the Conservatives in their history.

6.8 million people voted for the Conservatives this time, down from 14 million in 2019.

The Conservative Party may recover from this, but it may not. The 121 seats it retains are extremely fragile, with an average majority of 9%. While Labour may have reached close to its upper limit in challenging the remaining Conservative seats, there are still some - like Keighley and Ilkley, or Chingford and Woodford Green - that are reasonable targets for Labour. And, the Conservatives face the Liberal Democrats or Reform challengers in 29 of their seats. They are not guaranteed to return as a party of government.

Where did the Conservatives lose votes to?

The Conservatives’ right flank collapsed because of migration. Their left flank collapsed because they were perceived as extreme.

All voters blamed them for incompetence and corruption. The shadow of their behaviour during the coronavirus pandemic is long. This remained central to voters’ disgust at the Conservatives in this election.

In focus groups, people could hardly wait to speak about the failures. 

“They were concerned with bettering their own careers as opposed to bettering the lives of people in the country.”

– Jack, Leigh and Atherton


“[Sunak] hasn't got a clue, and to be that out of touch is frightening, he's never going to understand the working class mentality.”

– Lisa, Hendon


“They’ve failed in so many ways since COVID, it was just shambles - one thing after another and it became almost like an embarrassment and a laughing stock.”

– Priya, Hendon


“They were really selfish, too confident and making decisions that would impact millions of people without thinking it through.”

– James, Wakefield

YouGov polling on behalf of Labour Together asked people how they would describe the Conservatives in one word. The most common words were: liars, corrupt, useless.

But it was not just this context that led to collapse. Rishi Sunak contributed to it through his strategic blunders on immigration.

Sunak pledged he would stop the boats. The Conservatives then, at every opportunity, aimed to increase the salience of migration. They continued with this strategy, even when it was abundantly clear they had failed by their own measures.

We asked all Britons where they sat on a spectrum, between the UK allowing many more migrants to come and live here, and allowing many fewer migrants to come to the UK.

All groups leant towards thinking that the UK should allow fewer immigrants to come and live here.

But three groups feel it most strongly: Conservative voters, Reform voters and Conservative to Reform switchers. Conservative to Reform switchers think migration should be reduced more strongly than the average Reform voter does.

For every other voter group, the most important issue was health or the cost of living. For these three groups, it was immigration and asylum by a country mile. It is in this context that the Conservative failure has to be seen.

Voters were openly derisive of Conservative competence on this issue.

“They were all squabbling, falling out with each other, blaming each other, and still nothing was done with immigration! Sending them to Africa was just a joke, and that was millions of taxpayer money wasted - they had to go!”

– Jane, Leigh and Atherton;

 “Rwanda came across as quite an insane policy that made people look at them a bit deeper.”

– John, Leigh and Atherton

Having moved to shore up its right flank and failing spectacularly, the Conservatives looked increasingly unappealing to the rest of its coalition. As one focus group participant puts it,

“They have no clue, such as Braverman saying that homelessness is a lifestyle choice, they’re out of touch and don’t really know what’s happening to people in real life”.

– Will, Hendon

These centre ground, pragmatic voters switched to Labour, where they did the most damage. But they also switched to the Liberal Democrats, securing a remarkable increase in the number of Liberal Democrat constituencies. 

Tactical voting was extremely effective in removing Conservative MPs

"I thought long and hard about voting Green, but the bottom line was that I wanted change. I wanted to see the Conservatives out. Labour were going to have the best chance. It was a case of getting behind the winning team."

– Ravi, Bristol East

The electorate wanted to punish the Conservatives for all of its failures. Their success in doing so was remarkable. In November 2023, YouGov polling on behalf of Labour Together found that only 60% of voters knew who came first in their constituency and only 20% knew who came second. This did not change significantly for marginal seats.

Voters learnt fast - particularly in Liberal Democrat/Conservative contest seats. The following chart shows the increase in vote share for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, split by whether the Conservatives were principally facing a Labour or Liberal challenge.

The Liberal Democrats in particular benefited from this strategic behaviour. 14% of their vote came from people who would have preferred Labour, followed by 11% who would have preferred the Greens. [9]

Combined, this is the central strategic problem Rishi Sunak left the Conservatives with. Could they convince their right flank that they should believe Conservative promises on migration are worth the paper they’re written on, while simultaneously attracting back Middle Britain voters from Labour or the Liberal Democrats?

Conclusion

Labour planted its flag in the country’s ideological centre, attracting swing voters and wiping away scores of Conservative seats.

The Conservatives did a lot to lose this election. Even some months on, it is hard to do justice to the breadth of their tactical, operational and strategic errors.

But Labour created their own luck. Without that ruthless focus on Middle Britain, Labour would have won many fewer seats, probably not a majority, potentially not forming a government at all. To be in a position where it is trusted by these voters to govern, a single parliamentary term after their greatest repudiation of Labour, is remarkable.

Winning is unlikely to be the hardest part. People voted for change. It is clear from this review what change is not: bluntly, anything that isn’t high on the list of voters’ priorities. Most of all Labour must prove they are what voters wanted. Competent, moderate government which makes progress on their priorities.

Voters see political attention as zero sum. They are right to do so. Political focus is precious. Labour will either continue applying that focus on voters’ priorities, or it will fail. This is Labour’s task. To prioritise, plan and communicate its progress, in tangible terms that people can understand.

Britain’s problems are decades in the making and it will take multiple parliamentary terms to truly address them. In part 2, we will set out a new strategy for how Labour can win the next election, to deliver its essential long term vision.

 Methodology & Footnotes

  • This report has benefitted from the advice of an independent Technical Advisory Panel. The members of this panel are:

    • Professor Rosie Campbell - King’s College London

    • Professor Rob Ford - University of Manchester

    • Professor Paula Surridge - University of Bristol

    • Ian Warren - Director of Election Data

    The Technical Advisory Panel provided advice and feedback on the methodology employed to analyse the election results. They are not responsible for any of the content of this report.

  • The quantitative analysis contained within this report is based on results from two separate polls carried out by Labour Together and one poll carried out by YouGov.

    The first poll, is a nationally and politically representative sample of 10,209 adults in Great Britain, fielded online and sampled with a quota sampling methodology between the 15th and 25th July 2024. Figures were subsequently weighted to adjust for over or under sampling of certain groups. The sample is therefore representative by:

    • Vote in 2024 by region

    • Political attention

    • Age

    • Gender

    • Education

    • Vote in 2019

    The second poll is a nationally and politically representative sample of 1,466 adults in Scotland (aged 18+) fielded online and sampled with a quota sampling methodology between the 29th August and the 6th of September 2024. Figures were subsequently weighted to adjust for over or under sampling of certain groups. The sample is therefore representative by:

    • GE Vote in 2024

    • GE Vote in 2019

    • Independence referendum vote in 2014

    • Age

    • Gender

    • Education

    • Political attention

    • Scottish Parliamentary Region

    • Birthplace

    Although Labour Together is not yet a British Polling Council member, we are in the process of becoming a member, and abide by all of its rules. The researcher who carried out the polling is a member of the Market Research Society. Further information on our polling methodology is available here and the tables from this polling are available here and here.

    The poll by YouGov had a total sample size of 2,151 adults. Fieldwork was undertaken between 5th - 6th September 2024. The survey was carried out online. The figures have been weighted and are representative of all GB adults (aged 18+). This poll was used for responses to ‘The words that Britons associate with the Conservative Party’ question.

  • We undertook 12 online focus groups as part of this research with a total of 77 participants. These focus groups were in the following constituencies: Bristol East, Hendon, Leigh and Atherton, Stirling and Strathallan, Wakefield and Rothwell, and Wrexham.

    Participants in the focus groups (except for those conducted in Bristol East) were recruited on the basis of having voted Conservative in 2019 and Labour in 2024 but having strongly considered other relevant parties in 2024. In Bristol East the participants were recruited on the basis of half being Green voters in 2024 who had strongly considered Labour and half being Labour voters in 2024 who had strongly considered Green, all had voted Labour in 2019.

  • [1]
    DIAGNOSIS OF DEFEAT Labour’s turn to smell the coffee, Lord Ashcroft

    [2]
    Excluding those who didn’t vote or can’t remember.

    [3]
    We asked voters about whether ordinary people got a fair share of the nation’s wealth, whether the government should tax people more to fund public services and whether the government should nationalise major industries or undertake further privatisation. We ask a second battery of questions to estimate how authoritarian or liberal voters are by looking at their views on sentences for offenders, whether we should reduce migration and whether young people have respect for traditional British values. Their responses to these questions give a 21 point scale, where higher scores equal more left wing on the first scale or more authoritarian on the second scale.

    [4]
    This controls for demographic factors.

    [5]
    On new boundaries there were 57 Scottish seats in 2024 compared to 59 in 2019.

    [6]
    Henderson A., McMillan F., Larner J., Johns R., Carman C. and Hanretty C. (2022) "Scottish Election Study, 2021

    [7]
    YouGov polling of Westminister Voting Intention in Scotland, accessed via What Scotland Thinks https://www.whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-be-likely-to-vote-in-a-uk-general-election-asked-since-2019-general-election/?pollster%5B%5D=yougov

    [8]
    Labour/Conservative contests are seats where Labour and the Conservatives were in both first and second place in 2019 and where the majority was less than 15% (we can't use 2024 because Reform came second in many of these seats). Lib Dem/Con contests are seats where the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives were first or second in 2019. Lab safe seats are Lab held seats in 2019 which had a majority greater or equal to 15%.

    [9]
    Voters were asked 'If the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Green Party and Reform UK had an equal chance of winning in your constituency, how would you have voted?' If they chose a different party to the one they voted for, we say they preferred that party.

This report and analysis was undertaken by:
Christabel Cooper, Fintan Smith, Ben Szreter, Matthew Upton, Cam Vargas, and Morgan Wild.

Ruairidh Macintosh and Laura Akroyd also contributed to aspects of the research for this report.